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According to Rogoff, economic variables may fluctuate due to changes in 
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tests indicated that there is a negative relationship between inflation rate and 
independency of the CBRT. We could not find, however, any evidence to accept or 
reject the hypothesis of “an independent central bank results in a stable output 
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1. Introduction 
 
In contemporary monetary policy, it is generally accepted that there is a 
positive correlation between the independence of central bank and stable inflation. 
While an independent, central bank grants success in fighting inflation, the real 
output brings instability along with it. As Rogoff (1985) emphasized with his 
prominent study on the subject, the fluctuations in the real output increase while 
an independent central bank/monetary authority possesses a lower inflation rate in 
average. According to Rogoff, such conservative monetary authorities can only 
achieve stability in inflation. Empirical studies found negative correlation between 
independent central banks and the rate of inflation (Pollard, 1993; Prast, 1996). 
The relation between independent central bank and lower inflation is a 
subject of theory of business cycle. While the two models proposed by this theory, 
the relation between independent central bank and lower inflation rate is analyzed. 
The first model is called choice approach, which is perspective of Rogoff. 
According to his model, monetary policy power is left to a conservative central 
bank. A central bank disliking inflation does not need to consider the economic 
fluctuations, because it needs to create a low inflation rate. This choice will lead 
an independent central bank to be more successful in fighting with inflation. Thus, 
monetary policy should be free from political pressures. The second approach is 
Rrawls’ approach that describes the basis of independent monetary authority with 
institutional/ constitutional arrangements. The understanding of justice and 
freedom of Rawls (1975) defines the necessity of why monetary authority should 
be independent. According to Rawls, the main problem is the distribution of 
wealth. It is not possible to create an absolute criterion for equality in the 
distribution of wealth. Social and economic inequalities must be designed 
according to following critera: 
i) the less privileged ones will be more advantages  
ii) duties and roles  should be clearly assigned under the conditions 
that holds equal opportunity.  
In this sense, it is more logical to hand over political power to an independent 
monetary authority to execute economic policy so that it can fight inflation more 
effectively. Independent monetary authority will provide maximum benefit and 
equal opportunity by creating relatively low inflation for those who are least 
privileged. Consequently, according to Ralws’ logic, it can be deduced that the 
independence of monetary authority should be maintained before the founding 
contract or constitution of a nation is being written (Hayo, 1997, 5). 
The main aim of the study is not analyzing the Rawls’ approach. The study 
of Rawls lays the intellectual foundation of independent monetary authority for 
lower inflation (Gorowitz, 1994, 267-281). According to both approaches, lower 
inflation and an independent monetary authority will maximize the social benefit. 
However, the approach of Rogoff will be our starting point in analyzing the 
relation between an independent monetary authority and inflation rate. 
This paper consists of three parts. In the first part, Rogoff’s model will be 
revealed after explaining how economic policies increase inflation. After that, the 
concept of independence of Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) will be 
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calculated and evaluated. The independence of central bank played a critical role 
in success of disinflation programs in 1990s. The more independent central banks 
become the more credibility they will have. Thus, as the credibility of central 
banks increases, it is going to be easier to reach the targeted inflation level. In 
third part, the empirical relation between the independence of monetary authority 
and output (or inflation) will be studied for 1990 - 2004 period. 
 
2. Time Inconsistency and Credibility in Monetary Policy  
 
Credibility as a term means relying on the subject in practice. Even so, it is 
not easy to measure the credibility of monetary authority1. If a monetary authority 
is credible in its past policies, then, economic units trust the monetary authority. 
In the literature, credibility is defined three ways:  i) strength of inflation hatred, 
ii) motivation of compatibility, and iii) declaration of monetary policy. In some 
economic models, credibility is defined as the degree that the monetary authority 
dislikes inflation. In some others, however, it is defined as following the 
commitments that monetary authority promises. According to some economist, as 
long as monetary authority does not bind itself with commitments, it is not 
reliable (Persson&Tabellini, 1990). Along with this, the degree of commitment of 
monetary authority to price stability is synonym of credibility as well. Blinder 
(1998) conducted a survey with 84 OECD country monetary authorities and found 
a correlation between credibility and targeting price stability. 
The major factor influencing the credibility is time consistency. Time 
inconsistency is the change of policies laid down for the period (t+1) in period (t) 
(Blanchard&Fisher, 1989, 567). The reason that a time inconsistency arises is 
benefit maximization intention of political authority (McCallum, 1995). 
A monetary authority depending on a political authority can maximize the 
benefit only by maintaining an output level over natural output level. The way to 
do this is to create an unexpected inflation. Thus, while real wages are falling, 
output will exceed natural output, however, since economic units are rational they 
will either perceive this attempt of monetary policy or conduct a strategy of 
punishment in a consistent game. The result will be a higher inflation with a 
growth as much as natural output level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 If central bank has assigned a target, the difference between the target assigned and the 
expectations of market can be used to measure the credibility 
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Graph 1.Time Inconsistency 
 
Graph 1 shows the gains of monetary authority and targeted magnitudes. 
Dotted circles, indifference curves, represent the gains of monetary authority. As 
radius of indifference curve decrease, gain increases. The benefit of monetary 
authority depends on inflation and output growth.  
Let us suppose monetary authority targets 2 % inflation. If economic units 
rely on the commitments of monetary authority, they will arrange their contracts 
accordingly. Consequently, the economy will be stabilized at the level of natural 
output at 2% inflation rate. Monetary authority aims to maximize benefits by 
bringing output up to a level exceeding natural output. To do so, an unexpected 
inflation must be created. Thus, inflation rate will go up to 4 % and the realized 
output exceeds natural output. The equilibrium will be maintained at a lower 
indifference curve and thus, the monetary authority will increase its gains. 
Although monetary authority aims a 2 % inflation rate, it exceeded this target in 
order to maximize its benefits. As a result, time inconsistency takes place2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For a game theoretical analysis of the relation between the independence of monetary authority 
and time inconsistency, see Debelle& Fischer, 1994. In Debelle and Fisher’s study equlibrum 
inflation ratio is described as
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zero otherwise, if µ  is different than zero, the risk of surprise inflation emerges. In the proceeding 
parts notion b will be used in place ofµ . Because µ  for a political authority having the above 
benefit will not be zero, there will always be inclination of political authorities to deceive 
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Graph 2. Time Consistency 
 
As it is shown in Graph 2, economic units will notice this attempt and will 
not trust on the monetary authority. Therefore, they will form their expectations 
accordingly. As a result, the equilibrium will be maintained at point (d), a higher 
inflation will be obtained to target at (a) point and output will be realized as equal 
to its natural growth. 
Distrust of economic units on monetary authority results from monetary 
authority’s individual polices (unbinding policies). Policy makers are not 
committing themselves with individual policies, because such policy 
implementations have an inflation trend. In other words, they have a potential to 
create an unexpected inflation. Since rational economic units do not rely on the 
monetary authority, they shift their expectations according to the behavior of 
monetary authority. The result of such a process is inflation and instability. 
In contemporary economic policies, the policy of promises or rules is 
proposed to overcome the issue of time inconsistency. The policy of rules is to 
formulate the growth of future money3  or putting monetary authority/policy 
under a legal obligation of a certain level of inflation. The action of monetary 
authority is designated beforehand with the rule. With such a policy, the issue of 
time inconsistency will be overcame and thus, credibility will be established.  
 
3. A Simple Model for Independence of Monetary Authority 
 
The model used in this paper is an extension of Rogoff (1985) model and 
the supply structure of economy or output growth rate (y) is determined according 
to Lucas supply curve. 
t
e
ttty εππ +−=                                                                                         (1) 
In above equation, π  is inflation,  eπ  expectation of inflation,  ε  is 
normally distributed shock term whose average is zero and variance is fixed. 
When ett ππ = , the amount of output in economy will be equal to the amount of 
natural output. In this model, the expectations (especially, those about wages) are 
determined before shocks and policy makers’ decision on the inflation rate. Thus, 
                                                 
3
 Rule policy can be shown with an example. The amount of money will grow according to 
equation below; )05.0(5.001.0 1 −+=∆ −tt yM   (*) 
if  (*) is valid for each t=1,2,3…. Period, the designated formula is a rule policy (Akçay) 
 
Output 
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with respect to timing, επ ,et  come first and the policy variable, tπ , decided later 
by policy maker. Under these assumptions, equilibrium output growth rate in the 
economy, the policy maker determines inflation and expectations of inflation.  
The aims of the policy maker, inflation and output growth rate, can be 
shown with the help of loss function. The loss function described by equation (2) 
shows targets of the policy maker. The coefficient b in the loss function is output 
importance coefficient of political authority. Any deviation form these targets 
amplifies loss of policy maker. 
22 )(
22
1 kybL tt −+= π            b>0 ve k>0 dır.                                                
(2) 
When equation (1) is placed in equation (2), the values of tett y,,ππ  are 
obtained by taking the derivative of tπ and equalating it to zero under the 
assumption of rational expectations. 
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According to assumption of rational expectation the equation (3) ett ππ =  
can be written as follows, 
0)( =−+−+ kb tettt επππ  
bkb tt +−= επ                                                                                                     
(4) 
If the expected value of equation (4) is taken: 
bkbEE tt +−= )()( επ  
As 0)( =tE ε , the inflation expectations of rational individuals can be 
found as follows;  
bkE ett == ππ )(                        
(5) 
Since the economic units having rational expectations consider the 
inflationist impacts of economic policies into account (Hayo, 1997), the policy 
maker should consider this behavior while calculating the real inflation as well. 
Equilibrium inflation as a political variable which minimizes the loss function of 
policy maker can be  found by putting inflation expectation bkE ett == ππ )(  in to 
equation (3). 
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If necessary adjustment is done, we have: 
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     Equation (6) emphasizes two results about the outcomes of economic 
policies. First, the term “bk” shows the inflationist trend of economic policies.4 
Second part is a term of stability, which shows the diminishing impact of 
economic policies on inflation (Cukierman, 1994, 414-450). 
Equilibrium income level can be calculated by putting the values obtained 
in equation (5) and (6) in equation (1). 
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 Equation (7) and (8) show the result related to equilibrium income level 
according to the rational expectations assumption of Rogoff model. The 
expectation of economic units about equilibrium income level is equal to natural 
growth rate of the economy. It is necessary to look at variances of inflation and 
output in order to analyze the effects of economic policies on output and inflation. 
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Variances of both inflation and output depend on the coefficient “b” which 
is importance that policy maker put on the output. As “b” grows, the output is 
stabilized and inflationist trend is accelerated. 
If policymaker declares policies to be implemented against the shocks at 
the beginning of the term, and behaves accordingly, the inflationist trend of 
economic policies is eliminated (Schultz, 1996). Nevertheless, assumption made 
                                                 
4
 As political authority tries to grow the economy beyond limits, it creates budget deficit. When 
this deficit is met by source of monetary authority, inflationist trend emerges. See Fraser,1994, 
Kissmer&Wagner, 1998 
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in this paper accepts that policy maker has no such intention, because policy 
maker has incentive to divert from its commitments.   
According to Rogoff, the inflationist trend in economic policies can only 
be overcome by empowering an independent representative in making monetary 
policy. Such an application will increase social welfare. Policy maker should 
replace the representative and policy at the end of the term or at the end of a 
designated period.  
It is accepted that the importance the designated representative puts on the 
fluctuation on output (
^
b ) is different from that of policy makers. The 
representative will determine its own policies according to the shocks that may 
appear. The policy that representative adopts is the best one for policy maker 
during that period. Consequently, the problem for the policy maker can be 
described by equation (11) below: policy maker will assign a representative that 
can minimize the loss function. 
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The designated representative will follow the policy rule indicated in 
equation (6), but it will implement policy rule choosing 
^
b  instead of b. If policy 
maker chooses a representative that will minimize loss function, fluctuations in 
inflation will slow down. If 
^
b  in equation (11) is calculated, it is found 
that bb <<
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Equation (13) clearly shows the deduction of Rogoff’s idea, which 
is bb <<
^
0 . The output importance coefficient of policy maker is greater than that 
of independent representative. However, the fluctuations in inflation will be 
smaller for an independent monetary policy representative. The underlying reason 
for this is the empowerment of independent monetary higher inflation hatred 
coefficient. According to Rogoff, even if the independent monetary authority 
decreases fluctuations in inflation, it will increase the output fluctuations. 
Equations (9’) and (10’) below show this as follow: 
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   When var(y)<var(y)’  then, var(π )>var(π )’.  
  
4. The Independence of Monetary Authority in Turkey 
  
In the first part of the paper, it has been revealed that inflation stability is 
maintained through the concept of independence of monetary authority with the 
help of theoretical framework developed by Rogoff. This model leaves the power 
to execute monetary policy to the monetary authority for a designated period. 
During this period, monetary authority is completely independent from political 
authority. From this perspective, the independence of central bank can be assessed 
according to legal and economic conditions (Baydur & Süslü, 2002). In order to 
maintain stability of inflation, laws related to central bank should authorize 
monetary authority/central bank to use freely monetary policy instruments. Being 
entitled by law will not itself be enough to grant the independence of monetary 
authority. Moreover, an independent monetary authority should not have financial 
difficulties and balance of payment problems. 
 CBRT is the single monetary authority in Turkey.  Rediscount rate is not 
the only policy instrument that CBRT can use. Markets can be considered as an 
instrument of CBRT as well. CBRT can alter exchange and interest rates in 
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accordance with the targets. For example, CBRT has become an efficient actor of 
interbank markets with growing amount of public bonds by starting open market 
operations in 1986. Interbank monetary market became effective on April 1996. 
Foreign exchange markets opened in CBRT in 1988. CBRT has been able to 
influence exchange rates and interests with help of establishment of Đstanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE), development of secondary bond market and the other 
markets (Keyder, 2002, 78-98). The necessary legal framework was improved in 
the1990s and was complete in 2001. In other words, CBRT has full legal control 
of its instruments. 
 Even though the legal control over these instruments is absolute, using 
them efficiently for the aims of monetary authority depends on the economic 
conditions of monetary authority. In the period between 1980-1990 and 2000s, 
public deficit and balance of payments problems stayed as instability of Turkish 
economy and limited effective use of monetary policy. 
Public deficit, foreign deficit and saving deficits have resulted in economic 
imbalance (especially instability in inflation) in Turkey for years. The misuse of 
fiscal, and monetary policies have been considered as the factors damaging the 
independence of CBRT. Therefore, some limitations were imposed on the use of 
source of CBRT by Treasury Office, which was secured by a protocol signed in 
1997. From 1998 on, Treasury Office was prohibited to get loans from CBRT. 
The structural risks (banking sector and lack of social consensus) held by the 
austerity programme, which implemented in 1999, the abnormal depreciation in 
balance of payment caused by unpredicted external shocks (the rise in oil prices) 
and inconsistency between interest-exchange rate and inflation turned into a deep 
financial crisis in November 2000 and February 2001. These crises led to 
intensively use of CBRT sources as the final credit post. In 2001, a 21quadrillion 
TL was transferred to the banking sector. 
 The struggle to overcome the crisis of 2000 and 2001 led to signing a new 
Letter of Intention with IMF (Letter of Intention, 3-5-2001). This letter started a 
new initiative regarding to independence of CBRT. The willingness of CBRT to 
use the inflation itself as an anchor along with monetary anchor in this period 
accentuated the concept of independence. Because, as shown above, the 
importance that an independent monetary authority puts on inflation is greater 
then the political authority ( bb <
^
) . “As the first major step of the process, the 
LAW of Central Bank was amended so as to grant operational independence to 
the Central Bank as part of its primary duty to maintain price stability. The 
amendment involves many significant prerequisite: assigning price stability as 
primary duty of CBRT; official reporting to the government the developments 
recorded in the implementation of this target; appointing to term of office of not 
only Central Bank President and Governing Board but also of  Via-Presidents for 
a fixed term; and establishment of Monetary Policy Committee to recommend on 
planning and implementation of monetary policies. Above changes forbade CBRT 
to give any direct loan (including buying state bills from primary markets) after 
the transitory period that ended in the beginning of November 2001. The Central 
bank aims strengthening the technical infrastructure necessary for the 
implementation of inflation targeting, including the improvement of inflation 
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prediction techniques and the procedures of monitoring monetary policy and 
improvement of accountability” (TCMB, 2001) 
All these requirements describe the transfer of the process of monetary 
policy implementation from political authority to an independent authority, which 
was achieved by a new law passed in 2001. According to Article 4 of the law 
passed on April 25, 2001, the primary mission of the CBRT stated as follow: “The 
primary mission of the Bank is to maintain price stability. To do so, the Bank 
decides on the monetary policy to follow and monetary policy instruments to use 
directly itself. The bank reinforces the growth and employment policies of 
Government on the condition not to conflict with the target of price stability.5         
The CBRT is equipped with many rights to achieve the aims of fighting 
with the inflation. While the law passed in 2001 defines the primary duty of the 
CBRT as the fight against inflation, it renders the CBRT independent to decide on 
monetary policy. The new law can be seen as a developed version of the former 
one. The CBRT decides on the monetary policy with the political authority: The 
rights of the CBRT laid down by the law in 2001 as follow: “a) The privilege to 
issue banknotes is held by the Bank b) The Bank decides on the inflation target 
with the Government and monetary policy accordingly. The Bank is the only 
authority for the enforcement of the monetary policy and responsible for it c) The 
Bank is entitled to use the monetary policy instruments laid down by the this law 
or to decide on and apply the other monetary policy instruments which it finds 
necessary in order to maintain price stability d) The Bank is authorized to lend 
advances to saving and Deposit Insurance Fund in accordance with the terms and 
condition it will prescribe in case of extraordinary condition or shortage of source 
of this fund e) The Bank conduct credit lending function to the banks as the final 
credit authority f) The Bank has a right to request the banks to apply the interest 
rate on lending to the terms and conditions it will define g) The Bank is 
authorized to collect statically data and request necessary information form the 
Banks  and the other financial institutions and all the authorized organs in charge 
of monitoring and inspecting them” (The Law of CBRT , 2001). 
As seen in the law, CBRT does not decide on the monetary policy 
separately from political authority.  But, after the policy, the CBRT is completely 
independent to fulfill the policy. The law establishes a Monetary Board within 
CBRT to inform other economic intuitions of the developments.6 The law also 
describes the thing that the CBRT cannot do. According to Article 52 and 56, the 
monetary policy instruments are used in accordance with the monetary policy. 
CBRT cannot give any credit or advance to Treasury Office or other public 
intuitions. Consequently, the public sector is not allowed to use the source of 
CBRT by the law. However, this is frequently criticized, because the Bank is still 
authorized to lend advances to Saving and Deposit Insurance Fund on extreme 
                                                 
5
 For details, see The Law of CBRT, 25,4, 2001 
6
 Monetary Policy Board is comprised of Governor, Vice-Governors, a member elected from 
member of  Bank Board and a unanimously appointed  member with the recommendation of 
Governor. The undersecretary of Treasure or Vice-Undersecretary he will elect can attend the 
meeting without a voting right. Vice-Governor and Bank Board membership cease  being member 
of Monetary Policy Board {CBRT Law: 2001}   
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conditions as a final credit authority. This regulation does not deflect the inflation 
target of CBRT in an economy like Turkey with instabilities and high fragility. 
Because in an economy with massive public debts, tight monetary policy inhibits 
achieving inflation target (Baydur & Süslü, 2003). 
The relation with political authority and monetary authority can be 
revealed by looking at the appointment of governor of CBRT. The governor of 
CBRT is appointed by the decision of council of ministers for a 5-year period. 
The frequency of changes of CBRT governors shows the impact of political 
changes on CBRT. When we look at the frequency in 1990s; Rüştü Saraçoğlu, 
who started in 1987 remained in office for 6 years until 1993;  Bülent Gültekin, 
between 1993 and 1994; Yaman Törüner, between 1994 and 1995; Osman Cavit  
Ertan, as deputy governor, between 1995-1996, Gazi Erçel, between 1996 and 
2001 (Turan, 1998). Süreyya Serdengeçti has been governor since 2001. Political 
authorities might influence the monetary policy by changing the governor of 
central bank. However, the political authority cannot dismiss him directly 
according to the new law. The appointment and dismissal of the governor of 
CBRT has been arranged in article 25 and 27. The governor may be dismissed by 
the decree of council of ministers according to the conditions laid down by article 
27 and if he cannot conduct the duties conferred upon him. As seen in table 1, 
while frequency of change of CBRT governors is 25 %, frequency of change 
governments is 10 %. Therefore, the CBRT governors are more stable than the 
governments are. 
 
Table 1: Turkish Governments between 1990-2003 
47 Akbulut Hük.     
(09.11.1989-23.06.1991) 
 
48 I. Yılmaz Hük.     
(23.06.1991-20.11.1991)  
49 VII. Demirel Hük. 
(21.11.1991-25.06.1993) KP 
50 I. Çiller Hük.      
(25.06.1993-05.10.1995) KP 
51 II. Çiller Hük.  
(05.10.1995-30.10.1995)  
52 III. Çiller Hük.   
(30.10.1995-06.03.1996) KP 
53 II. Yılmaz Hük.    
(06.03.1996-28.06.1996) KP 
54 Erbakan Hük.  
(28.06.1996-30.06.1997) KP 
55 III. Yılmaz Hük.   
(30.06.1997-11.01.1999) KP 
56 IV. Ecevit Hük.   
(11.01.1999-28.05.1999)  
57 V. Ecevit Hük. 
(28.05.1999 - 18.11.2002 ) KP 
58 Gül Hük. 
(18.11.2002 - 14.03.2003) 
 
59 Erdoğan Hük. 
(14.03.2003 - )  
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For Coalition Prothocol 
 
The development of independence of CBRT can be calculated with the 
help of an index developed by Cukierman. This index displays the legal 
dimensions of the independence of CBRT after analyzing the law passed on 25 
April 2001 (Berument & Neyaptı, 1999). This index measures the independence 
of central bank with all aspects. The main items in  constructing the index: i- 
appointment of governor of central bank, ii-the goals of central bank, iii- 
establishment of monetary policy, iv whether any loan is given to the public 
sector. There are 59 sub- evaluation items (see Appendix 1). In order to construct 
the index, the law of CBRT passed on 4 April 2001 is analyzed. There are some 
differences constructing a relationship between the law of CBRT and the index. 
The criteria, in which these differences are found, are marked with asterisk in 
Appendix 1. 
The reason of this detailed legal framework is to help understand better the 
criteria included by this index. It will helpful to compare the index values 
calculated by Cukerman for past years with the index values calculated by us in 
measuring to development of independence of CBRT. If monetary authority has a 
full independence, the index will be equal to one. If it has no independence, the 
index will be equal to zero. Under this logic independence coefficient of CBRT 
went up from 44 %7 for the period between 1980 and 1989 to 64 % in 2003. 
Whether the independence rates are statistically different, this is checked 
through test of ratio. The calculated t value is 2.24.8    The H0 hypothesis, which 
expresses the new CBRT law of 4 April 2001 and did not bring any renovation for 
the independence of CBRT, is rejected. Consequently, the independence of CBRT 
grew after crisis in 2000 and 2001. This growth of independence provided CBRT 
with greater opportunities in fighting the inflation and maintaining stability at 
output growth than the post periods. But, the index Cukierman developed is an 
index of legal independence. For economic independence, financial discipline and 
problems in borrowing remain to be environmental factors weakening the 
independence of CBRT. Changes in public debt stock given in Table 2 summarize 
the situation. The other factors worth considering are external dependence of 
Turkish economy and financing the deficit with short-term sources. 
 
 
Table 2: International Borrowings and Budgetary Indicators 
                                                 
7
 See Cukeriman, 1995 
8
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Domestic Barrowing Stock (Billion TL) 
Years
Budget 
Def/G
NP Total Debenture 
 
(%) 
Consoli
dated 
Debts 
Bonds (%) Advances 
Domestic 
Barrowing 
Stock/GNP 
Domestic 
Barrowin
g Interest 
Payments
/GNP 
1990 3.35 57180 18801 32,9 30040 5469 9,6 2870 14.40 2.42 
1991 5.28 97647 24678 25,3 41122 18258 18,7 13589 15.39 2.67 
1992 4.30 194236 86388 44,5 34602 42247 21,8 31000 17.60 2.77 
1993 6.70 357347 190505 53,3 31933 64488 18,0 70421 17.89 4.63 
1994 3.91 799310 239385 29,9 133417 304230 38,1 122278 20.56 6.00 
1995 4.03 1361007 511769 37,6 25940 631298 46,4 192000 17.33 6.05 
1996 8.27 3148985 1250154 39,7 40 1527838 48,5 370953 21.02 8.87 
1997 7.62 6283424 3570812 56,8 0 2374990 37,8 337623 21.38 6.73 
1998 6.91 11612885 5771979 49,7 0 5840906 50,3 0 21.70 10.52 
1999 11.55 22920145 19683392 85,9 0 3236753 14,1 0 29.28 12.55 
2000 10.23 36420620 34362937 94,4 0 2057684 5,6 0 29.00 14.96 
2001 16.18 122157260 102127926 83,6 0 20029334 16,4 0 68.06 21.25 
2002 14.29 149869691 112849835 75,3 0 37019856 24,7 0 54.80 17.11 
    Source: Bekmez at. al. (2004) 
 
5. Econometric Model 
 
According to Rogoff, the inflation fluctuations will be lower with the 
existence of an independent monetary authority. Even though the independent 
representative reduces the inflation fluctuations, it will increase fluctuations in 
output. The equation (9’) and (10’) below explain this situation. 
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The theoretical deduction of (9’) and (10’) using tt b
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(6’) 
will be tested by equation (14) and (14’), (15) and (15’). 
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Equation (14) is an approach of time series, which tries to predict the 
inflation considering the past values of inflation and carries a dummy variable in 
it. In this paper, time series approach is preferred rather than a structural model for 
inflation. Although it is a simple testing procedure, it will be used here, because it 
serves very well for the purpose. Inflation tendency coefficient described as “bk” 
in equation (6’) should change depend on independence of central bank. As the 
dummy variable measures these changes, it is an appropriate testing instrument 
(Gujarati, 1998:420-450). Along with this test, the relation between independence 
of CBRT and inflation can be checked by testing whether estimation has a 
variable variance. As emphasized in Equation (14’), it is accepted that the average 
of estimation is zero and its variance is fixed. If the economy has been exposed to 
a structural transformation to influence the independence, it is expected that 
variance and the average of inflation should change. Accordingly, the relation 
between the independence of CBRT and inflation will be probed by using White’s 
variable variance procedure.  
In this paper, the months of the years after 2000 are assigned the value of 
1. While the independence of CBRT was supported by the protocol signed 
between Treasury Office and CBRT in 1997 and the Stand-By Agreement with 
IMF in 1998, the independence was reinforced with the law, which became 
effective in 2001. As a result, because the Letter of Intention in 1999 required the 
independence of CBRT as one of the structural measures, it is appropriate to give 
the value of 1 for 2000 and 0 for period beforehand. When such modeling is used, 
the time series used should be stationary. The stationary results are given in Table 
3. For this reason, the stationary at all series has been tested and all series are 
found non-stationary from (I) difference at the level of 1 %. 
       Table 3: Stationary Result 
 Level 1. Difference 
TUFE - -7.936392(a) 
Income -3.355008(c) - 
 
Two criteria are taken into account in order to calculate the appropriate 
length of delay. First, the terms of error in equation should not carry 
autocorrelation. In order to test this, equations (14) and (15) are estimated 
separately under the lag taken from 1 to 12. Autocorrelation between residuals for 
each lag has been tested with LM test. Second, the sum of error squares should be 
minimum. For this reason, Scwartz Information Criteria is calculated under each 
lag. The length of lag is taken as the length of lag, which minimizes the 
information criteria. The length of lag from 1 to 12, probailities of LM test and 
AIC values are given in Table 4. It is suggested that error term in H0 hypothesis in 
LM test have no autocorrelation.  If the marginal significance level of test is lower 
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than the chosen significance level (0.05) of the test, H0  has to be rejected. 
According to this, the most suitable length of lag for model (14) is 2. The 
regression results obtained are shown in Table 5. 
 
   Table 4: Calculating the Length of Lag of Variables 
Lag LM-p 
value 
AIC LM-p value AIC 
 TUFE INCOME 
1 0,2478 4,6240 0,7539 5,3378 
2    0,0024*    3,8490*      0,0000**      5,3888** 
3 0,4723 3,7828 0,6541 5,0900 
4 0,1653 3,8190 0,5396 5,2461 
5 0,5327 3,8213 0,5869 5,2879 
6 0,4139 3,8723 0,6404 5,3248 
7 0,4084 3,9089 0,4507 5,3714 
8 0,6736 3,9554 0,1672 5,4198 
9 0,3641 3,9837 0,0061 5,4454 
10 0,7812 3,9989 0,0021 5,4924 
11 0,2953 4,0440 0,0000 5,4400 
12 0,2842 4,0724 0,0000 5,4642 
 
As seen in Table 5, two lagged values of inflation and dummy variable are 
significant. The chosen model can explain 43 % of the inflation. The F value is 
statistically significant. The possibility not to take place is zero for equation (14). 
The statistical significance of dummy variable and being negative render Rogoff’s 
theoretical proposition valid for Turkey. The monthly averaged inflation of an 
independent central bank is different from the monthly average of inflation of a 
dependent central bank.  The independence of CBRT can be tested by White’s 
test. If any changing variance is found, as a result of changes of independence of 
CBRT, inflation and variance are expected to change. As can be understood from 
Table 5, 4743.0*110* 2 ==Rn , as it exceeds 1 % threshold value with a 
degrees of freedom 4, it conforms with Chi square  distribution. Relying on this 
trial, we can accept that there is variable variance. Such a trial seems to support 
that the inflation average changes in parallel with the independence of CBRT. 
 
 
Table  5: Inflation and independence of CBRT 
Dependent Variable: TUFE 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1994:05 2003:08 
TUFE=C(1)+C(2)*TUFE(-1)+C(3)*TUFE(-2)+C(4)*KUK 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 3.851368 0.433366 8.887104 0.0000 
C(2) 0.356413 0.063458 5.616524 0.0000 
C(3) -0.137890 0.063983 -2.155105 0.0334 
C(4) -1.650139 0.343288 -4.806868 0.0000 
R-squared 0.435878     Mean dependent var 4.146791 
Adjusted R-squared 0.420208     S.D. dependent var 2.038148 
S.E. of regression 1.551929     Akaike info criterion 3.751935 
Sum squared resid 260.1161     Schwarz criterion 3.849024 
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Log likelihood -206.1084     F-statistic 27.81599 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.449757     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Table 6: White Variable Variance test of Equation (14’) 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 3.526091     Probability 0.001211 
Obs*R-squared 24.07902     Probability 0.002223 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -3.023194 3.283103 -0.920834 0.3593 
TUFE(-1) 1.257781 0.773704 1.625661 0.1071 
TUFE(-1)^2 0.051935 0.022931 2.264787 0.0256 
TUFE(-1)*TUFE(-2) -0.366121 0.138285 -2.647577 0.0094 
YTUFE(-1)*KUK 0.947095 0.537688 1.761422 0.0811 
TUFE(-2) 0.986160 0.650463 1.516089 0.1326 
TUFE(-2)^2 0.066236 0.031587 2.096929 0.0384 
TUFE(-2)*KUK -1.652113 0.536592 -3.078898 0.0027 
KUK 3.729014 2.731927 1.364975 0.1752 
R-squared 0.214991     Mean dependent var 2.322465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154020     S.D. dependent var 4.361114 
S.E. of regression 4.011230     Akaike info criterion 5.693017 
Sum squared resid 1657.267     Schwarz criterion 5.911468 
Log likelihood -309.8090     F-statistic 3.526091 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.692409     Prob(F-statistic) 0.001211 
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We obtain the result in Table 7 if an equation similar to equation (14) for 
revenue and exposed to regression. Autocorrelation between residuals of each lag 
for proper length of lag has been tested with LM test and Schwartz Information 
Criteria has been calculated. The regression results are given in Table 7. The 
length of lag of consequent dependent model is taken as the length of lag, which 
minimizes the information criteria. The length of lag from  1 to 12, LM test 
possibilities and AIC are given in Table 4. It is suspected that there is no auto 
correlation in terms of error in H0 hypothesis in LM test. If the marginal 
significance level of test is lower than the chosen significance level (0,05, 0,01), 
H0 is rejected. Accordingly, the best length of lag for equation (15) is 2. 
Regression results obtained are given in Table 7. 
 
  Table 7: Output and Independence of CBRT   
Dependent Variable: Gelir(g) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1994:04 2003:08 
Included observations: 113 after adjusting endpoints 
Gelir(g)=C(1)+C(2)*G(-1)+C(3)*G(-2)+C(4)*KUK 
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 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.240902 0.424138 0.567980 0.5712 
C(2) 0.891871 0.095745 9.315042 0.0000 
C(3) -0.019510 0.095725 -0.203815 0.8389 
C(4) 0.292202 0.647372 0.451366 0.6526 
R-squared 0.766559     Mean dependent var 2.778761 
Adjusted R-squared 0.760134     S.D. dependent var 6.846186 
S.E. of regression 3.352999     Akaike info criterion 5.292344 
Sum squared resid 1225.443     Schwarz criterion 5.388888 
Log likelihood -295.0174     F-statistic 119.3089 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.791102     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The chosen model can explain 76 % of growth rate of output. The F value, 
which shows the appropriateness of this equation modeling inflation, is 
statistically significant. The statically insignificant of dummy renders Rogoff’s 
theoretical proposition invalid for Turkey.  The impact of an independent central 
bank on the stability of monthly output has been detected. Consequently, when we 
expose equation (15) to regression, as the rise in independence of CBRT changes 
the variance of error term, equation (15’) can be tested with White Test. If any 
chancing variance is found, as a result of changes of independence of CBRT, 
variance of term of error is expected to change. In table 8, the variance does not 
change according to White Test. In this trial, there is no statically proof 
supporting the change of output growth rate in parallel independence of CBRT. 
   
Table8: White Variable Variance Test of Output Regression Equation 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.574124     Probability 0.797042 
Obs*R-squared 4.779391     Probability 0.780874 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 18.95130 6.277449 3.018949 0.0032 
YY(-1) -0.027763 1.328765 -0.020894 0.9834 
YY(-1)^2 -0.126972 0.116158 -1.093097 0.2769 
YY(-1)*YY(-2) 0.142248 0.197382 0.720671 0.4727 
YY(-1)*KUK 0.007358 2.072246 0.003551 0.9972 
YY(-2) 0.165560 1.319598 0.125463 0.9004 
YY(-2)^2 -0.164213 0.169465 -0.969010 0.3348 
YY(-2)*KUK -0.998912 2.065300 -0.483664 0.6296 
KUK 3.808069 7.334535 0.519197 0.6047 
R-squared 0.042295     Mean dependent var 10.84463 
Adjusted R-squared -0.031374     S.D. dependent var 34.10665 
S.E. of regression 34.63755     Akaike info criterion 10.00405 
Sum squared resid 124775.0     Schwarz criterion 10.22127 
Log likelihood -556.2288     F-statistic 0.574124 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.549361     Prob(F-statistic) 0.797042 
 
5.Conclusion 
 
According to the theoretical framework developed by Rogoff, it is 
proposed that monetary policy should be handed over to an independent 
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representative for economic stability. According to Rogoff, transferring monetary 
policy to an independent representative has both advantages and disadvantages. 
While an independent monetary policy representative succeeds in the fight against 
inflation, it boosts the stability in output. Such representative of monetary policy 
is called conservative central bank in economic literature. In order to probe this 
theoretical deduction for Turkey, the independence of CBRT should be calculated. 
The independence coefficient of CBRT increased from 44 % between 1980 and 
1989 to 64 % in 2003. In the equation of inflation described in Table 4, the 
coefficient of dummy variable which represents the independence of CBRT has 
been found -1.65 and the new fixed term of inflation equation is obtained when 
this value is subtracted from the fixed parameter of the equation expressed in 
Table 4. The value of this fixed term is 2.20. The independence of CBRT has 
changed level of average inflation. This means that independence decreases the 
value of output assigned by the CBRT. As Rogoff suggests, economic units 
determine their inflation expectations according to the importance monetary 
authority puts on output. In other words, output importance coefficient of an 
independent monetary authority is smaller: 0<b^<b. If asses the fixed coefficient 
of equation in Table 4 as the output importance coefficient, the output importance 
coefficient after April 2001 went down from 3.85 to 2.20. This meets the 
theoretical expectations. White’s Variable Variance Test verifies the impact of 
CBRT independence on inflation. But, the hypothesis that central banks cause 
instability at output has been verified. The variance of output equations has not 
changed under White Variable Variance test. 
Credibility is crucial element of all monetary policies or inflation 
targeting. It is apparent that the credibility of an independent central bank is high. 
For the CBRT, which targeted inflation below 12 % in 2004, independence is a 
vital political instrument to attain its goal. The observation of a negative 
correlation between inflation and the independence of CBRT is an empiric reality 
supporting the theory. Consequently, although the independence of CBRT has 
been reinforced by a legal adjustment, the structural problems of economy should 
be eliminated to maintain this independence, As long as the sustainability of 
public debts is not improved, the fragile structure in banking sector is not 
repaired, and the monopolistic trends of the markets are not halted, the increase in 
the independence of CBRT will not suffice. 
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Appendix 1 
Table  1: General Index of  Independence of CBRT 
Grup: Legal 
Changes 
Weight(%20) 
Weights of 
subdefinitions are 
equal9. 
 
Variable Definitions  
 
Degree 
 
Coefficient 
 
CBRT 
Contribution of 
Grup 
Contributions of 
sub items  
 
   
 CBRT President Stays in Duty    
  x>8 1  
  8>x>6 0,75  
(0,03)  X=5 0,50 0,50 
  X=4 0,25  
 
 
x<4 0  
 Who appoints the CBRT 
President 
   
 CBRT committee  1  
 Council  0,75  
(0,03) Assembly and Committee of 
Ministers 
 0,50 0.,50 
 Prime Minister  0,25  
 Economy Minister  0  
 Conditions that CBRT 
president stays in duty 
   
 1-none  1  
(0,05) 2- Non-political reasons  0,83 0,83* 
 3-CBRT committee decision  0,67  
 4- By a legal institution  0,50  
 5- Institution without any 
conditions 
 0,33  
 6- Political decisions  0,17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,11 
 7-No reason  0  
Grup: Political 
Formulation 
(%15) Weights of 
subdefinitions are 
equal 
    
 Who determines monetary 
policy? 
   
 1-CBRT itself  1  
(0,03) 2-CBRT and government  0,66 0,66 
 3-CBRT recommendation  0,33  
 4-Government  0  
 Orders of Government and 
Solutions 
   
 1-CBRT is the last authority  1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,08 
 2-Government is the last 
authority and it determines 
everything 
 0,8  
                                                 
9
 Definitions of these weights are completely subjective (Cukierman, 1994:374).  
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(0,05) 3-Consultation with CBRT 
representative  
 0,6  
 4-Legal institution is the last 
authority 
 0,4  
 5- Institution on duty is the last 
authority 
 0,2  
 6-Institution on duty is the last 
outhority without any condition 
 0  
 CBRT has active role in 
determings its own butdget 
   
 1-yes  1  
(0) 2-no  0 0 
 
    
Aims of CBRT (%15)     
(0,15) 1-Price stability os the only aim  1 1 
 2- mentioning price stability is 
the only aim 
 0,8  
 3- Price stability does not 
contradict with other aims 
 0,6  
 4- price stability contradicts with 
other aims 
 0,4  
 5-no aim  0,2  
 
 
 
0,15 
 6- price stability is not only aim  0  
Limitation of 
Debts 
 
    
(%15) Limitation of progress    
(0,15) 1- Government puts limitations 
on debts 
 1 1 
 
2-Progress is allowed but limited  066  
 
3-  Government may alter the 
limits 
 0,33  
 
4- no limit  0  
(%10) Limitations of APĐ 
transactions 
   
 
1- Government puts obsticales 
on debt increase 
 1  
 
2-Debt increase is allowed but 
limited 
 066  
 
3-  Government may alter the 
limits 
 0,33  
 
4- no limit  0 0 
(0) 
 
   
(%10) Who controls debt increse    
(0,10) 1- CBRT  1 1 
 2-Legally determined  0,66  
 3-Law, CBRT, and other 
authorized institutions together 
 0,33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,25 
 4-Authorized institution only  0  
 (%5) weights of 
sub definitions 
are equal 
Who barrows?    
 
1-Federal government only  1  
 2-Federal and local governments  0,66  
 
 
 (0,004) 3-Institutions  0,33 0,33 
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 Private Sector  0  
 Type of limit, if any?    
 1-Cash amount  1 1 
 2- % of CBRT capital  0,66  
 3-% of government incomes  0,33  
 4-% of government expenditures  0  
 
 
   
 Length of Credits    
(0,016) 1-6 months  1 **1 
 2- 1 year max.  0,66  
 3- more than 1 year  0,33  
 4- no limit  0  
 Limitations on Interest rates    
(0,016) 1-CBRT loan interest rates 
cannot be higher than market 
rates 
 1 1 
 2- interest rates of CBRT cannot 
be less than that of min. interest 
rate in the market 
 0,66  
 3-Credits cannot exceed a 
certain level 
 0,33  
 4-no limitation  0  
 Limitations on primary 
market debts 
   
(0,016) 1- buying government share 
from primary market is limited 
 1 ***1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,052 
 2- no limit  0  
TOPLAM=0,642  
* CBRT Law, Article 28 
** CBRT cannot do reescount more than 120 days and API more than 91 
days.  
*** Completely limited.  
 
 
